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PREFACE 
In the fall of 1861 the Confederacy decided to send a second diplomatic 
mission to Europe: James Mason to London and John Slidell to Paris. Mason 
and Slidell slipped through the Union blockade and booked passage from Havana 
to London on the Trent, a British mail packet. On November 8, 1861 Charles 
Wilkes, captain of the Union warship San Jacinto, stopped the Trent in the 
Bahama Channel. Instead of escorting the vessel to a Union prize court, which 
could legally judge who or what on board the British vessel constituted contra-
ii 
band, he seized the two emissaries and let the Trent resume its voyage. Wilkes 
became a hero in the North, but when news of the capture reached Britain, the 
English viewed it as a planned insult. British Foreign Minister Russell instmcted 
Lord Lyons, the British ambassador to the United States, to demand an apology 
' from Secretary of State Seward and the release of the Confederate diplomats. 
Anticipating a rejection of their ultimatum, Britain began war preparations and 
transported additional troops to Canada . After intensive Cabinet deliberations 
the Union agreed to free the envoys, explaining that Wilkes, acting without orders 
from Washington, had used improper procedures in making the capture. Mason 
and Slidell were released January 1, ~862 and eventually reached England on 
the twenty-ninth. 
The Trent Affair Lri.volved many issues: Anglo-American political and 
economic relations, international law, and diplomatic efforts of the North and 
South during the Civil War. In the thesis I hope to explore the incident in the 
. ,
iii 
context of these larger issues. I make no claim. to have written a definitive 
study of the Trent Affair. Because of time and monetary restrictions my 
examination of archival material has been limited. The Seward Papers, micro-
films of the Adams Papers, published collections of documents, and a few major 
newspapers constitute the primary sources I investigated. If the following 
pages bring the various facets of this critical event into clearer focus, my 
objectives will be satisfied . 
• < 
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THE TRENT AFFAIR: CHRONOLOGY 
1860 
South Carolina secedes 
1861 
Remaining Confederate states have seceded on or before this date 
Lincoln inaugurated 
Bombardment of Fort Sumter begins 
Union begins blockading the Confederacy 
First Confederate envoys: Mann, Rost, and Yancey arrive in 
England 
Britain proclaims neutrality 
Union defeated at the Battle of Bull Run 
Mason and Slidell appointed as ambassadors 
Mason and Slidell slip through the blockade surrounding Charleston, 
s.c. 
Mason and Slidell leave Havana, Cuba on board British Mail 
Steamer Trent 
Mason and Slidell captured by Captain Wilkes in the Old Bahama 
Channel 
The prisoners arrive at Fort Monroe, Virginia 
News of the capture reaches Washington, D. C. 
News of the capture reaches England 
Mason and Slidell imprisoned at Fort Warren, Boston 
British government's demands sent to Ambassador Lyons 
Lyons explains British demands to Seward 
Official U.S. response communicated to Lyons 
1862 
Mason and SLdell released 
News of Mason and Slidell 's release reaches England 
Mason and Slidell arrive in England 
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I. ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS 
The Trent Affair re-ignited latent controversies and exposed the diplo-
matic issues and personalities of the Civil War. Neutral rights, impressment, 
slavery, free trade, self-determination, "King Cottonlf--the incident embraced 
all of these. It severely tested the capacities of government leaders: Prime 
Minister Palmerston, Foreign Minister Russell, Ambassador Lyons, President 
Lincoln, Secretary of State Seward, and Ambassador Adams. Woven into this 
fabric the seemingly insignificant incident becomes meaningful. 
In 1861 the Liberal Party, led by Prime Minister Lord John Palmerston, 
controlled the British government. · Possessing extensive political experience, 
Palmerston was seventy-seven when the Trent Incident occurred. He had sat in 
the House of Commons almost continuously since 1807, had been Foreign Secre-
tary on three separate occasions, and was serving for the second time as Prime 
Minister. He deplored Southern slavery, but viewed the North as a po\verful 
commercial rival. An ardent nationalist, the term "Palmerstonian" became an 
adjective describing Englishmen who favored a chauvinistic foreign policy. In 
his second tenn, Palmerston concentrated on coordinating the activities of his 
cabinet, leaving Lord John Russell great freedom as Foreign Secretary. In 
Parliament and as Prime Minister (1846-52) the sixty-nine-year-old Russell 
had gained a reputation as an aristocrat who promoted some reforms. Cool, 
uncharismatic, and somewhat indecisive he adopted a careful stance toward the 
' _. 
American conflict. Although he abhorred slavery, Russell strived to protect 
British trade interests and to keep many options open. 
2 
Lord Lyons (Richard Bickerton Pernell), a forty-one-year-old bachelor, 
had been the British Minister to the United States since April 1859. He had 
joined the diplomatic corps in 1839, holding numerous minor posts in Europe. 
An industrious and painstaking worker, Lyons was honest, dutiful, and sensible. 
His calm temperament, cautiousness, and balanced judgment served him well 
during the Trent Crisis. Having friends in both factions, he reported events to 
Russell with insight and impartiality. Lyons felt that by utilizing a blend of 
caution and firmness he could protect British interests and avoid any serious 
difficulties between the two com1tries. 
Many Englishmen initially saw the Civil War as a moral conflict over 
slavery . This became a major obstacle for Mason and Slidell, and later Con-
federate envoys. Britain had outlawed slavery throughout her Empire in 1833 
and expected the Union to quickly do the same. However, to retain border state 
support Lincoln asserted in his March fourth inaugural address: ''I have no pur-
pose, directly or indirectly to interfere with the institution of slavery in the 
States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no 
inclination to do so. 111 The President did not issue the Emancipation Proclama-
tion m1til September 22, 1862. On November 29, 1861 in the midst of the Affair, 
Lord Lyons wrote to London that a re-examination of the emancipation question 
would soon be forced on Lincoln. Even after Wilkes' insult many cabinet secre-
taries still felt m1easy about supporting the Southern slave-holding states against 
. ' .• 
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the North. 2 Some members of the ruling Liberal Party, notably Richard Cobden 
and John Bright, perceived the war as ultimately a struggle over the fate of 
slavery and democracy. Even English workingmen saw the Union as a symbol 
of free labor and believed a Northern victory would increase their chances of re-
ceiving the franchise. 3 But following Mason and Slidell 's capture, workers 
quickly forgot these sentiments, succumbing to the anti-Union hysteria that en-
gulfed the country. 
Economic self-interest as much as moral fervor determined British 
policy. Prior to the Civil War, English trade with the United States was second 
only to trade with her Emprie. The British Ambassador in Washington sought 
to prevent any political obstacles from hindering this commerce. 4 Some English-
men believed neutrality served British interests best. They pointed to substan-
tial wartime profits from trade with the North and the probability that Union 
warships would attack their merchant vessels if England chose to openly aid the 
South. Others interpreted the situation differently, regarding a united America 
as a more dangerous commercial rival than a divided America. They cited 
English dependence on Southern cotton and steep Union tariff barriers versus 
the free trade policy of the Confederacy. When the Trent Affair re-focused at-
tention on British assistance to and recognition of the Confederacy, economic 
questions assumed great importance. 
The Union blockade of the Confederacy beginning on April 19, 1861 be-
came the paramount commercial issue in Anglo-American relations. The 
establishment of the blockade confirmed England's worst fears. On February 
16, 1861 Russell had written to Lyons: 11Above all things endeavour to prevent 
* , .. 
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a blockade of the Southern coast. It would produce misery, discord, and enmity 
incalculable. 115 In her attempt to sever Southern supply lines the North ham-
pered English trade. ·Britain challenged the legitimacy of the blockade since 
there were too few Union warships to cover the 3500 miles of coastline nominally 
included. Mason and Slidell had to slip through the blockade to leave Charleston 
and their capture prompted a re-consideration of British policy toward this bar-
rier to trade. 
How did official British policy toward American develop in 1861 prior to 
the Trent Incident? At each step in the intensifying struggle Lord Russell took 
a hopeful view. In the fall of 1860 before the secession crisis he hoped the con-
flict would be settled without a rupture. After all of the Southern states had 
seceded on February first he wished the North and South would accept a peaceful 
separation and not resort to arms. The bombardment of Fort Sumter on April 
twelfth dissolved this illusion. Nevertheless, Russell miscalculated again--be-
lieving the war would end quickly and result in a permanently independent 
Confederate nation. 6 Although Lord Lyons took a more pessimistic view of the 
situation, most British officials continually underestimated the bitterness of the 
American struggle. The humiliating Union defeat at Bull Run on July 21, 1861 
had a profound impact on British opinions regarding the Civil War. Pro-Southern 
factions solidified, initial expectations of a brief war diminished--what origi-
nally appeared as a noble crusade against slavery had turned into an internecine 
battle. 
Neutrality became the official British policy during the Civil War. In 
late December 1860 Russell cautioned Lyons to avoid favoring one party over 
5 
the other and if asked for advice to merely urge a nonviolent solution of the dis-
pute. 7 Britain issued a formal Proclamation of Neutrality on May 13, 1861, ten 
days after the first Confederate diplomatic mission had met informally with Lord 
Russell and the very day Charles Francis Adams (the new U. s. Ambassador to 
England) arried in London. It warned all British subjects against giving any 
assistance to either party--including supplying munitions, or conveying soldiers, 
dispatches, or arms. A major diplomatic triumph for the South, the Proclama- · 
tion recognized the Confederacy's status as a belligerent power, thus acknowledg-
ing her right to outfit privateers. The Proclamation pronouncement also indirect-
ly conceded the legitimacy of the Union blockade. 8 Britain's official neutral 
status and the prohibition against transporting dispatches had major significance 
in the Trent controversy. 
One critical issue the Trent Affair re-ignited stretched back sixty years 
to the turn of the century. Yankees saw in the past impressment of American 
sailors a precedent justifying the seizure of Mason and Slidell. During the wars 
of the French Revolution, English ship captains, ignoring American claims that 
U. S. ships constituted sovereign territory, repeatedly seized "British subjects" 
to man their ships. Among these so-called Englishment were approximately 
9,000 genuine American citizens? Impressment, a common and legal procedure 
in England, technically could not be practiced on foreign soil or against Ameri-
cans. Britain, calling U. s. sovereignty claims extravagant, disagreed and 
continued the seizures which became a major cause of the War of 1812. By 
1861 impressment had ceased to be a source of tension between the two countries. 
. , ,• 
Because of many similarities to Wilkes' action the controversy re-emerged, 
this time with the roles reversed. 
6 
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II. UNION FOREIGN POLICY 
When the Trent Crisis occurred, William Henry Seward, the United 
States Secretary of State, was sixty years old. A strong anti-slavery activist, 
lie had served as governor of New York, u. S. Senator, and since 1856 as the 
acknowledged leader of the Republican Party. Perceiving the President as a 
simple-minded rural politician, he attempted to dominate Lincoln. Seward 
gathered the reigns of power around himself, thinking he could dictate Union 
foreign policy. He initially hoped the country could avoid war, but gradually his 
attitudes hardened. Concerned that the President lacked a consistent policy for 
dealing with the rebellion, Seward formulated his own suggestions and sent them 
to Lincoln on April first. In the conflict's early stages the Secretary of State 
had vacillated between bellicosity and fear of foreign war. The April first docu-
ment favored the former. He declared the Union should demand explanations of 
British, Russian, Spanish, and French policies toward intervention in the con-
flict. If satisfactory explanations were not received from Spain and France he 
recommended declaring war. In addition Seward urged sending U.S. agents to 
Canada, Mexico, and Central America to arouse a "vigorous spirit of indepen-
dence" against European intervention. 1 
Lincoln let these inflammatory proposals die, but their essence reached 
the ears of foreign ambassadors in Washington. In Britain fact augmented by 
rumor soon gave Seward a reputation for irresponsibility, recklessness, and 
9 
warmongering. In a letter to Seward on December 10, 1861 Thurlow Weed, a 
fellow politician and friend, reported a rumor, which illustrated the extent of 
British distrust. In a November 1860 dinner given by Edwin l\Iorgan, the gover-
nor of New York, the Duke of Newcastle claimed Seward had declared he would 
become either Secretary of State or President and would proceed to provoke a 
quarrel by insulting the British government. 11 Though Seward probably intended 
the rema rk as a joke, its widespread publicity hindered future relations with 
Britain when he became Secretary of State. Many Englishment believed Seward 
ordered the seizure of Mason and Slidell to incite war between the two nations. 
Only after his prudent handling of the Affair did English suspicions of Seward 
diminish. 
In contrast, from his arrival in London on May 13, 1861 Charles Francis 
Adams, the U.S. Ambassador to Britain , seemed to gain the trust and respect 
. of the British government. His father, John Quincy Adams, and grandfather, 
John Adams had both been ambassadors to England. A graduate of Harvard and 
a lawyer by profession, Charles had received two years of formal schooling in 
England. He joined the Republican Party in 1856, was elected to Congress, and 
became a close friend of Seward. Even-tempered, patient, and cautious, 
Adam's personality suited his position. 
After learning of Adams' appointment Lyons wrote to Lord Russell that 
this was a "very good appointment," indicating the United States would not pur-
sue a vicious anti-British policy. 12 A week after Adams' arrival Russell 
echoed these sentiments in a letter to Lyons: "Mr. Adams has made a very 
favourable impression on my mind as a calm and judicious man. n 13 The cool 
... 
10 
dignified manner of the new ambassador seemed to harmonize with the similar 
temperament of Lord Russell . . Ironically many of Adams' early difficulties re-
sulted from his fellow American, Seward, rather than from his English hosts. 
Adams constantly strived to allay British suspicion of the Secretary of State. 
Seward made Adams' job even more difficult by failing to properly inform him 
about current U.S. positions. This lack of communication caused considerable 
strain during the Trent crisis. 5 
The principal aim of Union foreign policy was to prevent any European 
intervention that would tip the balance toward the Confederacy. While con-
structing a bloc kade to cut economic assistance, the North tried through diplo-
macy to forestall recognition of Southern independence by the nations of Europe . 
These objectives guided Seward and the Cabinet in their response to British 
demands following the seizure of Mason and Slidell. 
, ,• 
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III, CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 
To counteract the moral appeal of the anti-slavery issues, the South 
developed their own ideological base for foreign policy. Self-determination and 
states' rights formed this foundation. Their emissaries ex"µlained to European 
statesmen that secession was not a revolutionary act. According to their inter-
pretation of the U.S. Constitution, the states possessed sovereignty, having 
voluntarily let the federal government exercise certain authority. In seceding 
they had me r ely re-assumed that au thority for themselves . 1 Northern attempts 
to abolish slav ery constitute d an unjust invasion of state ri ghts. The peo ple of 
the South were simply demanding the historic right of self-determination. 
The "Southern gentleman" theory composed a second element in the Con-
federacy's ideological platform. This theory postulated that as members of a 
landed oligarchy the Southern planters and the English aristocracy shared simi-
lar views, interests, and lifestyles. Therefore Britain should intervene to aid 
her "Southern kinsmen." The extent to which pro-Southern sentiment permeated 
the English gentry is uncertain. Furthermore, this sentiment may have re-
sulted as much from disillusionment with the Union as from any particular 
affinity for the South. Prior to the Civil War, the North had gained a reputation 
among some Englishmen as a degenerate democracy ruled by a vulgar mob. The 
Union also lost its key moral edge when Lincoln refused to abolish slavery im-
mediately. So as the North's reputation diminished, the South's increased. In 
the area of economics the "Southern gentleman theory" suffered from a major 
13 
flaw. The main commercial partners of the Southern planters were the English 
2 
cotton manufacturers, not the landed gentry. In the uproar following the Trent 
Incident the British aristocracy generally viewed Mason and Slidell as gentle-
men subjected to barbarous treatment by the Yankees. Ultimately the "Southern 
gentlemen theory" failed to convince Britain to assist the Confederacy. 
Confederate envoys possessed fairly strong economic justifications to 
buttress their moral arguments. These centered around Confederate advocacy 
of free trade and British dependence on Southern cotton. Being an agricultural 
region the Southern states deplored any duties that would raise the cost of the 
manufactured goods they had to import. They charged that the high tariffs 
passed by the Northern majority in Congress were discriminatory products of 
sectionalism. As an independent nation the Confederacy promised free trade 
and elimination of protective tariffs. 3 That was the carrot. Ironically, 
Southern cotton export policy became the stick. Nineteen percent of Britain 1s 
4 population depended on the cotton industry and in the years just before the 
Civil War an average of seventy-six percent of all British cotton imports came 
from the Southern states. 5 The Confederacy could have used this dependency 
positively to encourage intervention by England or negatively, withholding cotton 
until assistance came. The South chose the latter policy. Though no law en-
forced compliance, planters voluntarily imposed an embargo on cotton exports 
to Europe. By the time of the Trent Affair this embargo was firmly in place 
and highly effective. 6 
One objective of Mason and Slidell 1s mission was to enhance the Con-
federacy's prestige abroad. To achieve this they had to overcome the contempt 
14 
many Europeans had for their predecessors: A. Dudley Mann, Pierre Rost, and 
William Yancey. Robert Bunch, the British Consul at Charleston, South 
Carolina, lmew nothing about Rost and described Mann as an individual of poor 
character and the son of a bankrupt grocer. Bunch characterized Yancy (the 
mission's leader) more favorably, calling him an able lawyer, yet was disturbed 
about his extreme views which included wanting a renewal of the slave trade. 7 
Whether justified or not Mann, Rost, and Yancey could take some credit for 
Britain proclaiming neutrality on May thirteenth. Ten days before they had met 
informally with Lord Russell. 8 The first mission to Europe achieved nothing 
else of consequence and by November it became clear that the South needed new 
advocates abroad. 
The foremost goal of Confederate foreign policy was to attain recognition 
as an independent sovereign nation . Upon reaching this status, Europe would 
challenge the Union's blockade of Southern ports, opening the way for essential 
manufactured goods. Such trade could lead to direct assistance and eventually 
European intervention. Mann, Rost, and Yancey, and later Mason and Slidell 
struggled to accomplish these objectives of recognition, trade, assistance, and 
intervention in their discussions with European governments. 
1 
2 
3 
, .• 
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IV. MASON AND SLIDELL: THEIR MISSION, 
CAPTURE, AND IMPRISONMENT 
' .• 
By fall 1861 Mann, Rost, and Yancey had spent five months in Europe. 
16 
Recognition and intervention, the Confederacy's primary diplomatic aims, had 
not been achieved. President Jefferson Davis decided to send a more presti-
gious pair of emissaries to England and France. On September 23 he officially 
designated James M. Mason of Virginia and John Slidell of Louisiana, ambas-
sadors of the Confederate States of America to London and Paris respectively. 
James Mason, the grandson of George Mason of revolutionary fame, 
had a moderate and amiable demeanor. Although his tobacco chewing and un-
kempt appearance repelled some persons, he possessed great charm. A former 
U.S. Senator and Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, he had led the 
fight for passage of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act. 1 After John Brown's raid on 
Harpers Ferry (October 1859) Mason called for an investigation to determine if 
a northern Republican Party conspiracy was responsible. One of the first advo-
eating Virginia's secession, he discussed the upcoming state-wide election to 
decide the question in a May sixteenth letter to the Winchester Virginian: 
If it be asked what those shall do who cannot in conscience vote 
to separate Virginia from the United States, the answer is simple 
and plain. Honor and duty alike require that they should not vote 
on the question, and if they retain such opinions they must leave 
the state. 2 
John Slidell, a prosperous New Orleans attorney and businessman, began 
his political career in 1842 as a U.S. Representative. In 1845 President Polk 
sent him to Mexico in an unsuccessful attempt to resolve the disputes that 
. ' 
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eventually ended in war. Later, as a U.S. Senator and member of the extreme 
Southern rights party, he gained a reputation for skillful and vigorous promotion 
of secession. Speaking in the Senate when Louisiana withdrew from the Union, 
Slidell bitterly declared: 
This will be war and we (the South) shall meet it with different 
but equally efficient \.veapons. We will not pern1it the consump-
tion or introduction of any of your manufactures; every sea will 
swarm with our volunteer militia of the ocean, ... 3 
Because of their zealous defense of slavery and secession, Mason and Slidell had 
already become anathemas in the North before their capture. 
Termination of the Union blockade, recognition of Confederate indepen-
dence, and intervention by Britain and France constituted the principal goals of 
Mason and Slidell's mission to Europe. Furthern10re, they hoped to form com-
mercial and friendship alliances with the European powers; procure foreign 
loans, weapons, and munitions; and neutralize diplomatic efforts by the North 4--
·a tremendous assignment indeed! To achieve these objectives Mason and Slidell 
planned to rely on the familiar state sovereignty, "King Cotton," and free trade 
arguments. They also intended to emphasize the Confederacy's military victories, 
in addition to her potential as a source of raw materials and a market for manu-
factured goods. 5 
Britain knew about Mason and Slidell's mission prior to its departure 
from America. Palmerston assured Ambassador Adams that the delegation's 
presence ''would scarcely make a difference in the action of the (British) govern-
6 
ment. However, Palmerston feared that a Trent-like incident might occur. 
Learning that a Union warship had anchored in Southhampton harbcr, he consulted 
18 
the English advocate-general, who said the warship could legally haul a British 
vessel, carrying Confederate envoys, back to a United States' prize court. 
Adams reassured Palmerston that the Union vessel possessed no instructions to 
seize Mason and Slidell. 7 
Embarking from Charleston, South Carolina, Mason and Slidell had to 
elude three Union steamers, a frigate, and a sloop of war which blockaded the 
harbor about six miles from shore. 8 Employing a small fast steamer, the 
Theodora (re-named to confuse the blockaders) and choosing a dark rainy night, 
they slipped by the Union ships at a little past midnight on October 12, 1861. 9 
After a stop at Nassau in the Bahamas, Mason confidently wrote to his wife, 
"having run the blockade successfully everything else is plain sailing, because 
under any foreign flag we are safe from molestation." The Theodora reached 
the coast of Cuba the morning of October sixteenth and was escorted into Car-
denas (100 miles down the coast from Havana) by a Spanish man-of-war. To 
their consternation, Mason and Slidell discovered they had missed the British 
mail packet bound for England and would have to wait three weeks for the next 
10 
one. The two emissaries spent much of this time as honored guests of a 
Confederate supporter, who owned a sugar plantation located between Cardenas 
and Havana. 11 They also visited the Captain-General of Cuba, who seemed to 
sympathize with the Southern cause. Having no fears of capture, Mason and 
Slidell did not attempt to conceal their mission. The ladies of Havana publicly 
12 presented a Confederate flag to them. 
Mason and Slidell' s departure came at a time when Union military defeats, 
recent British reinforcement of Canada, and the presence of an English fleet off 
19 
the east coast seemed to enhance prospects for the envoys' success. Northen1-
ers1 anxieties grew when it became known that a British l\I. P. had visited 
Richmond shortly before the emissaries' departure. News received by the Union, 
concerning the diplomats' itinerary was · delayed and .inaccurate. Smarting from 
criticism of their .Porous blockade of the South, Navy officials sent three cmisers 
to pursue the Nashville, upon falsely hearing that the two ambassadors were on 
board. The seizure attempt failed. The U.S. Consulate in Havana learned of 
the Theodora's arrival on the day Mason and Slidell disembarked at Cardenas, 
hut it took eight days for this intelligence to reach New York. On October thirti-
eth, Secretary of State Seward and Navy Secretary Gideon Welles learned that 
Mason and Slidell planned to leave on the British mail packet, the Trent; and 
that the Union warship, the San Jacinto , was nearing Cuba. Deciding to attempt 
to capture the envoys, Seward and Welles dispatched two vessels to Havana, but 
neither arrived in time to contact the San Jacinto. 13 
Charles Wilkes, the sixty-two year-old U.S. Navy captain of the San 
Jacinto, was not a man who needed orders. A daring, independent, glory-seeker, 
he had led an expedition to Antarctica in 1838 and had had a giant area of that 
continent named Wilkes Land after himself. He developed an early dislike for 
Britain when an English naval officer used some of his findings on Antarctica 
without giving him credit. Wilkes' fame had faded and he was eager to re-estab-
lish his reputation in the War. Returning from a twenty-month patrol of the 
west coast of Africa, the San Jacinto reached the southern coast of Cuba on 
October twenty-third. 14 There Wilkes first head of Mason and Slidell' s arrival 
and was ordered by the U. s. Consul to come to Havana immediately. Wilkes 
' , 
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discussed seizing the emissaries with the Consul (Robert W. Shufeldt), after 
arriving in Havana. Encountering no strong opposition to the plan, Wilkes left 
for Key West on November second. Unable to find any other vessels to rein-
force his expedition, he left Key West two days later-, without having bothered 
to consult Judge Marvin, an expert on maritime law. 15 
As with many historical events the Trent Incident has acquired its own 
conspiratorial aura. According to this theory Mason and Slidell met secretly in 
Havana with Wilkes, and arranged their capture. This assumes that Mason and 
Slidell, guessing the degree of English wrath caused by a minor violation of their 
neutrality, could believe their value would be greater as prisoners than as diplo-
mats. It also supposes Captain Wilkes would eagerly betray the nation he had 
served so long. Mason admitted that 'hvo officers (Wilkes was not one of them) 
of the San Jacinto visited him in Havana while their steamer was being re-sup-
. plied. Mason claims he said nothing concerning the purpose of his voyage to 
England, but any account of the conversation is so far unknown. Curiousl y, 
Mason's daughter omits this discussion from her book because it "contains 
nothing of public interest or history. 1116 No conclusive evidence exist s to prove 
or dispro, ,e this conspiracy theory. Though possible, such a collusion seems 
unlikely. It is clear that Captain Wilkes first learned about the emissaries while 
in Havana. 
Mason and Slidell departed for England on November seventh on board 
the British Royal Mail Steamer Trent. They joined about eighty other passengers, 
most of whom were British. 17 Meanwhile, the San Jacinto cruised to a narrow por-
tion of the Old Bahama Channel through which the Trent would have to pass and 
lay in wait. 18 In taking this action Willms overruled D. M. Fairfax, his chief 
lieutenant, who urged prior consultation with the judge at Key West. In his 
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official report Wilkes said he examined "numerous" international law books on 
board ship. Wilkes, in a unique application of seizure principles, called Mason 
and Slidell "embodiment of dispatches. 1119 Lacking expertise in international 
law and probably convinced this was his chance to become a national hero, Cap-
tain Wilkes neglected to consider the international consequences of his actions. 
Around noon on November eighth the two ships sighted each other. The 
San Jacinto fired a warning shot when the Trent approached within a mile . She 
failed to slow down so the San Jacinto launch ed another shell across the Trent's 
bow from a distance of just 250 yards. Seeing armed men and exposed guns on 
the Union warship, Captain Moir stopped the Trent. 20 Three cutters from the 
San Jacinto, led by Lieutenant Fairfax, pulled up alongside the Trent. Wilkes 
instructed his deputy to practice restraint and avoid force if possible in seizing 
Cl 
the emissaries. Captin Moir refused to show his passenger list, but John Slidell 
voluntarily identified himself. 21 The Royal Mails Officer declared the capture 
illegal. 22 and other passengers denounced the marines who boarded the ship: 
Did you ever hear of such an outrage? They would not have dared 
to have done it if an English man-of-war had been in sight! These 
Yankees will have to pay for this. This is the best thing in the 
world for the South. 23 
Fairfax allowed the two emissaries and their secretaries, George Eustis and 
James McFarland, to collect their baggage before being escorted to the San 
Jacinto. In an incident later dramatized in the London Tin1es, Slidell's daughter 
defiantly barred bayonet-carrying Union marines from entering her father's 
, .. 
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cabin room. Though appreciating his daughter's bravery, Slidell knew resist-
ance was futile and returned to the deck through a window. 24 Finally, the 
cutters returned to the San Jacinto with their four prisoners. The two ships 
parted at about 3:30 in the afternoon, about two hours after Lieutenant Fairfax 
had boarded the Trent. The seizure was accomplished without injuring anyone 
·th hi 25 on e1 er s p. 
Captain Wilkes knew international law required him to take the entire 
vessel to the United States, where a prize court would determine whether the 
dispatches aboard were contraband. Yet to avoid further inconvenience for the 
Trent's other passengers he merely seized the two emissaries and their secre-
taries, and let the British ship resume its voyage to England. 26 Surprisingly, 
Wilkes did not search for any dispatches. Mason and Slidell did possess dis-
patches, which they managed to lock in the Trent's mail room. Th ese were 
delivered to Confederate agents when the Trent reached London. 27 By neglecting 
standard search and seizure procedures, Wilkes placed the Union government iil 
an awkward position for dealing with the British. 
The courteous treatment of the envoys continued after their capture. Con-
federate or Union prisoner-of-war would have gladly exchanged places with them. 
Captain Wilkes treated them as "cabin guests, 11 housing them in his own state-
room. The San Jacinto arrived at Fort Monroe, Virginia on November fifteenth, 
but when Secretary of State Seward heard the news he directed Wilkes to convey 
the prisoners to Fort Warren, built on an island in Boston harbor. 28 Colonel 
Dimmick, the commanding officer, did not handle the four emissaries like other 
• J 
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prisoners at the Fort. They received mail daily, read newspapers, could order 
wine or other luxuries from Boston, and were provided with a servant! 29 Mason 
and Slidell hoped their gentlemanly confinement would continue and provoke war 
betvveen the Union and England. 30 
.. • 
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V. THE INITIAL AMERJCAN REACTION 
When news of Mason and Slidell's capture reached America, spontaneous 
jubilation engulfed the North and South. The Confederacy, anticipating British 
entry into the war, celebrated the Union's rude violation of neutral rights. 
Latent Anglophobia surfaced in the North, where Wilkes became the hero who 
had twisted the tail of the British lion and frustrated Southern diplomatic efforts. 
Ignoring the international consequences of the seizure, many Northern Congress-
men and Cabinet members praised the action. News of the capture disturbed 
President Lincoln, who pondered a variety of possible eA'Planations to reassure 
Britain. Businessmen concerned about the consequences of angering England 
deluged Secretary of State Seward with letters filled with advice. The Trent 
Affair seemed estined to kindle the passions of every person in America. 
The Confederate people, press, and leaders reacted joyously to the cap-
ture of their envoys. They hoped the North's blunder would provoke British 
intervention. Expecting the termination of diplomatic relations between Britain 
and the Union, Baltimore secessionists celebrated. 1 The Richmond, Virginia 
Enquirer bubbled: 
The ships of England are all that we want to :fill the measure of our 
warlike appli ances. The destruction of the blockade will give us 
supplies, and give us a market for our industry. We shall have 
social comforts, and we shall have the munitions of war. Nay, 
the blockaders will be blockaded! An English fleet in the Chesa-
peake, and in a month Fortress Monroe would be ours by starva-
tion. 2 
' ' 
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The South relished the thought of the Union entangling itself in war with England 
or Lincoln humiliating himself by having to release the two emissaries. Specu-
lating on the North's options the Enquirer wrote: 
Which Lincoln will fear most to offend--the English government 
or the Northern mob remains to be seen . . .· . it would be an 
agony to the North to be compelled to let our ministers go; nay 
to send the ·rn by a Government vessel, deliver them aboard a 
British ship, and salute the British flag. If they rejoice over 
Mr. Mason's capture with a special joy, as doubtless they do, 
his restoration would be to them a special humiliation. 3 
Confederate rejoicing persisted until Seward's compromising reply to British 
demands was announced about a month and a half later. 
Southerners thought the British government would not endure the insult 
to their flag without taking forceful action . The Confederate people envisioned 
an outraged English public demanding unconditional retribution. Yet some 
Southerners were a bit apprehensive. The New Orleans Cr esce nt said the cap-
ture would "either arouse John Bull to the highest pitch of indignation or 
demonstrate that there has b ee n an understanding between the two governments 
for a long time--that England has been and is assisting the abolition government 
to the detriment of the South. "4 Expressing the general optimism that over-
shadowed these mild anxieties the Richmond Enquirer remarked: "We confess, 
therefore, that we look with much interest and much hope to the next news from 
5 
across the waters." 
The Confederate government shared the excitement of its people. While 
Lincoln avoided public discussion of the incident, President Jefferson Davis 
offered his opinion regarding the legality of Wilkes' action in a message to the 
Confederate Congress on November eighteenth: 
'' 
These gentlemen (Mason and Slidell) were as much under the juris-
diction of the British Government upon that ship and beneath its 
flag as if they had been on its soil, and claim on the part of the 
United States to seize them in the streets of London would have 
been as well founded as that to apprehend them where they were 
taken. 6 
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So the South rejoiced at the News of Mason and Slidell's capture, celebrating not 
the act itself, but its expected effect in England. 
The North also celebrated, praising Captain Wilkes' courageous action, 
which thwarted Confederate diplomacy and gave Britain a "dose of her own 
medicine." The day after news of the capture reached New York, the Times 
commented: "We do not believe the American heart ever thrilled with more 
genuine delight than it did yesterday, at the intelligence of the capture of Messrs. 
Slidell and Mason ... 117 A correspondent . from the London Times viewed this 
genuine delight differently: "There is so much violence of spirit among the 
lower orders of the people, and they are so ignorant of everything except their 
own politics and passions, so saturated with pride and vanity, that any honorable 
concession, even in this hour of extremity, would prove fatal to its authors. ,,s 
Northerners, stunned by early defeats in the war, finally had something to cheer 
about. 
Charles Wilkes became an instant hero throughout the nation. The city of 
Boston hosted a banquet for Wilkes and the officers of the San Jacinto, with the 
Mayor, Governor, Chief Justice of the State Supreme Court, and 150 other 
guests attending. 9 Judge George Bigelow, evidently carried away in the 
euphoria of the moment, declared that, "Commodore Wilkes acted more from the 
noble instincts of his patriotic heart, than from any sentence he read from a 
. -· 
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law book ... " in such a situation 11 • •• a man does not want to ask counsel or 
to consult judges upon his duty; his heart, his instinct, tells him what he ought 
to do. 
1110 
Thus Union patriotism coalesced around this obscure navy captain. 
Yet in the midst of the general satisfaction mild apprehensions began to 
emerge. Some questioned the legality of the capture. The Chicago Times 
warned that by endorsing Wilkes' act the United States would be justifying the 
past impressment of American sailors and other British violations of neutral 
. 11 
rights. 
How would England react? This too caused concern. Optimists believed 
Britain would merely ask for an apolog-y, but others thought release of the emis-
saries would be demanded . The New York Times predicted a massive public 
- 12 
outcry l ed by the Tories that would severely test the Liberal ministry. 
Despite these fears, few Northerners anticipated the intensity of English outrage 
or the uncompromising nature of their demands, coupled with actual preparations 
for war. 
Union businessmen constituted a unique group in their reaction to the 
Trent Affair. Possessing commercial vessels throughout the world vulnerable 
to British attack, merchants advocated compromise. Stock and commodity 
prices fell in December, reflecting economic uncertainty. 13 Businessmen wrote 
Secretary of State Seward, warning that war with Britain would devastate the 
Northern economy. Pledging their loyalty regardless of the government's deci-
14 sion, the merchants nevertheless hoped for a peaceful settlement. Because 
Captain Wilkes endangered commercial interests, businessmen were among the 
few who questioned his wisdom. 
. .' 
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The national euphoria penetrated the U. s. Congress. Charles Sumner, 
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committ ee, initially seemed to approve 
the capture. He wrot~ Seward on November seventeenth, listing two historical 
precedents justifying the action. 15 On December second Congress capped the 
cascade of praise Wilkes received by passing a joint resolution: 
Resolved, That the thanks of Congress are due, and hereby 
tendered, to Captain Wilkes, of the United States navy, for 
his brave, adroit and patriotic conduct in the arrest and dr 6 
tention of the traitors, James M. Mason and John Slidell. 
Additional resolutions were approved requiring authorities to treat Mason and 
Slidell like convicted felons. 1 7 
At first, most Cabinet members wholeheartedly commended Captain 
Wilkes' performance. Navy Secretary Gideon Welles sent Wilkes a lett er on 
Novemb er thirtieth, using words he would later regret: "· .. Your conduct in 
seizing these public enemies was marked by intelligence, ability, decision, and 
. 18 firmness, and has the empha tic approval of the Department. 11 Both Welles 
and Attorney General Edward Bates approved of Wilkes' procedure, except they 
maintained the Trent itself was also subject to seizure. Bates misinterpr eted 
the legal issues of the case and underestimated the English reaction: 
While the fact brings great and general satisfaction, some timid 
persons are alarmed lest Great Britain should take offence at the 
violation of her Flag. There is no danger on that score. The law 
of nations is clear on the point, and I have no doubt that, with a 
little time for examination, I could find it so settled by English 
authorities .19 
Believing that Wilkes had exceeded his legal authority and that an enraged 
England would use the insult as an excuse for war, Postmaster General 
Montgomery Blair was the sole Cabinet member to immediately condemn the 
'. 
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capture, In jest he suggested that Wilkes should personally transport Mason 
and Slidell to England to indicate the Union's utter contempt for the two envoys. 20 
Time, Britain's ultimatum, and Seward's arguments eventually persuaded the 
Cabinet to alter its original position. 
Acting with discretion, President Lincoln did not even mention the Trent 
Affair in his annual message to Congress on December 3, 1861. 21 The President 
lost sleep over the capture, anticipating a severe reaction in England. 22 Some 
persons urged Lincoln to use the incident to force Great Britain to acknowledge 
specific rights of neutral nations. 23 Others such as Senator Sumner advised 
employing a nonpartisan European power to arbitrat e the Affair. 24 Caution and 
flexibility characterized Lincoln's early handling of the incident. 
From the beginning of the crisis, citizens inundated Secretary of State 
Seward with letters suggesting 11proper" courses of action for the U.S. govern-
ment. Surprisingly, most of the writers advised compromise rather than 
vociferous defense of Wilkes' actions. 25 Former Secretary of State (1857-60) 
Lewis Cass said Mason and Slidell would be harmless in Europe and war with 
Britain would prevent restoration of the Confederate states to the Union. 26 
Another letter called those who wanted war with England, allies of the South. 
Defense of neutral rights constituted the best stance, since in future European 
wars the United States would probably be neutral. 27 Writing from Europe, 
Seward's close friend Thurlow Weed explained the seriousness of British 
feelings. 28 This correspondence may have prompted Seward to choose a more 
conciliatory reply to Britain than that favored by the public. 
... 
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Deciding to wait for the official British response to the capture, Seward 
took few concrete actions besides reassuring Ambassador Adams. He did order 
Captain Wilkes to take Mason and Slidell from Fort Monroe, Virginia to Fort 
Warren in Boston harbor and placed Robert Murray on the San Jacinto as a State 
Department observer. 29 On November thirtieth Seward wrote a letter (received 
by Adams December seventeenth) which helped allay British suspicions and 
diminished fears of war. Complimenting Lord Lyons' calm handling of the inci-
dent, Seward said Wilkes acted entirely on his own and remarked, "This govern-
ment has carefully avoided giving any cause of offence or irritation to Great 
Britain. 1130 Shunning both vigorous defense of \Vilkes' action and immediate 
compromise, the Secretary of State let Britain take the initiative in dealing with 
the Affair. 
. .'
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VI. THE BRITISH RESPONSE 
Furious indignation ensued when news of Captain Wilkes' action reached 
England on November twenty-seventh. One Englishman reported to Seward: 
The people are frantic with rage, and were the country polled I 
fear that 999 men out of 1,000 would declare for immediate war. 
Lord Palmerston cam1ot resist the impulse if he would. If he 
submits to the insul 1 to the flag his ministry is doomed--it would 
not last a fortnight. 
The London Times declared: "It requires a strong effort of self-restraint to 
') 
discuss with coolness the intelligence we publish today . • . 11'"' Uncertainty about 
future trade with the United States caused an abrupt drop in London stock prices. 3 
Members of the Liverpool cotton exchange issued the following resolution, after 
a hastily-called meeting the afternoon of the twenty-seventh: 
That this meeting, having heard with indignation that an American 
Federal ship of war has forcibly taken from a British mail steamer 
certain passengers who were proceeding peaceably w1der the 
shelter of our flag from one neutral port to another do earnestly 
call upon the Government to assert the dignity of the British 
flag. 4 
The capture of Mason and Slidell confirmed Britain's worst suspicions 
about the Yankees. From the beginning of President Lincoln's administration in 
March, rumors had magnified facts to produc~ distrust of Secretary of State 
Seward. The seizure appeared to many Englishmen as another one of the 
Secretary's bellicose schemes. The London Times commented: 
The splenetic mind of Mr. Seward has, indeed, been continually 
infusing his colleagues with a feeling of enmity to this country . 
. . . It is this habit of unscrupulous partisanship, ingrained 
in the very nature of the Americans, which will be the chief 
obstacle to a friendly settlement. 5 
' .. 
Another charge was that the Union had taken advantage of Britain's peaceful 
demeanor: 
They must by this time know us and our unwillingness to draw the 
sword against them, or to take any part in their unhappy quarrel. 
Indeed, our patience and long suffering have not improbably led 
to the series of insults of which the outrage on the Trent is the 
last and most offensive. 6 
Caught in the midst of this tempest, Northern emissaries in England 
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found themselves in a precarious position. Lackin g definite information on of-
ficial Union policy, Charles Francis Adams, the U. s . Ambassador to London, 
was assaulted on all sides. On November twenty-ninth Adams wrote two letters 
to Seward. In the first he stated, ' 1The excitement caused by the lat e news of 
the seizure of Messrs. Mason and Slidell is . so great as to swallow up every other 
topic for the moment. 117 In the second letter he said: 
The pride of the British nation is deeply touch ed. Th e consequences 
for further usefulness in my present capacity threatens to be soon 
at an end . . . . I conf ess that the turn thin gs have taken has given 
me great anxiety for the fate of my unha ppy country. But I shall 
await with resignation the instructions which will probably close 
my mission. 8 
At a meeting with Foreign Minister Russell the same day Adams confessed that 
he knew no more about the seizure or Union policy than anyone could learn from 
the English press. 9 That night Adams lamented in his diary: "On the whole I 
can scarcely remember a day of greater strain in my life. lO Whether through 
oversight, lack of thoughtfulness, or indecision, Secretary of State Seward 
neglected to inform Adams regarding official Union policy in the Affair. Even 
so late as early January, Adams was still relying on the British newspapers 
for his information. Because Adams overcame these handicaps and retained 
. '
remarkable public poise, Lord Russell's respect for the U.S. Ambassador 
deepened during these difficult weeks. 
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Situated in Europe on a special diplomatic mission, Thurlow Weed, a 
shrewd politician and close friend of Seward, also came under fire. Weed 
traveled between London and Paris, stri ving to keep Seward well informed and 
to counteract anti-Union sentiment. On December seventh he wrote to Seward: 
"Surely this cannot be a time you choose for War with England, when all her 
People are \'Vith the Government, and when everything here is upon a War 
·footing. 1111 As part of his efforts Weed wrote the London Times on December 
twelfth: 
I confess to a strong '!yearning" that the English Government, 
its press and its people may be disa bused of an impression which 
has so generally obtained, that our Government seeks occasion 
for disagr ee ment or cherishes other such feelings as belo ng to 12 
the relations of interest and amity that blend and bind us together. 
Such tireless lobbying by Thurlow Weed did much to further the Northern cause. 
After the initial frenzy cooled, some Englishmen began calling for restraint. 
A Manchester Guardian editorial reflected this trend: 
There are a great many reckless men who would at once urge on 
a war to redress the alleged insult to the British flag; but this 
is by no means the general feelin g , and among some of the lead-
ing merchants the first embullition of an ger is giving place to 
anxiety l est the Government should too precipitately be disposed 
in favour of a resort to arms. 13 
Most major English religious denominations issued pleas for peace :4 The press 
admitted that Seward may not have ordered the capture and that loose British 
interpretations of international law in the past were partly responsible. 
Englishmen viewed the U. s. Congress' congratulation of Wilkes with alarm, but 
38 
saw Lincoln's silence on the Affair in his annual message to Congress as an 
15 indication he might be contemplating peaceful compromise. Some Liberals, 
thinking it preposterous that such a tiny incident could ruin years of friendly 
r elations, continued to praise the North's democracy and stand against slavery. 
Secr etary of State Seward had decided to l et England make the first move 
in the Tr ent Affair negotiations. The British government had to determine the 
legality of the capture and then decide on an appropriate course of action. The 
English people freely expr essed their opinion on both of these issues. Views 
ranged from accepting Wilkes' act, to declaring it totally illegal. Corresponding 
responses suggested ranged from acqui escence to issuance of an ultimatum, 
coupled with mobilization for a possible war. 
After studying depositions by officers of the Trent, the Law Officers of 
the Crown concluded that Captain Wilkes had erred in not taking the entire vessel 
to a U.S. prize court, which could then legally decide if anything on board consti-
tuted contraband. By capturing Mason and Slidell on his own Wilkes usurped the 
role of a prize court judge. 16 Emotional considerations aside, this legal opinion 
gradually became accepted by many factions in England. One pro-Union letter to 
the editor of the London Times went so far as to declare that since Wilkes violated 
only the "form," not "substance" of international law, Britain should merely 
demand an apology and not require release of the prisoners. 1 7 Few Englishmen 
would have tolerated such a weak response. On November thirtieth, a London 
Times editorial maintained that even if the United States claimed Mason and 
Slidell as citizens their capture still violated the law of asylum. 18 Amid this 
' ,• 
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discussion of legal technicalities, the English people's demand for forceful action 
by their government did not diminish. 
Members of Parliament, newspaper editors, prominent individuals, and 
merchants eagerly proposed a variety of 11proper 11 responses for the British 
government. The economist and pro- Union political leader Richard Cobden said 
Britain should demand release of the prisoners and lifting of the Northern blockade 
of the Southern coast (on all but war materials). Cobden also believed the inci-
dent provided an excell ent opportunity to force the United States to ratify the 1846 
Congress of Paris agreements, which granted greater freedom for neutral na-
tions . 19 The editor of the London T im es s ugge sted im po sing an im m ediate 
embargo on shipm ents of war materi a ls to th e Union . 20 Baron Brunnow, the 
Russian Ambassador to England, offered his services to help arbitr a te the mis-
understanding. 21 The most popular course of action ad vocated consisted of 
demanding an apology and liberation of the prisoners, threatening war if the 
Union did not comply. 
The British government, with Prime Minister Palmerston and Foreign 
Secretary Russell playing the leading roles, agreed on an official response just 
five days after news of the Trent incident reached England. Operating under 
in tense pressure from the citizenry and Parliament, the Cabinet decided on a 
list of demands, which were sent to Lord Lyons, the British Ambassador in 
Washington, December second. Until he received this dispatch on December 
eighteenth, Lyons himself remained silent, making no comments whatsoever on 
the legality of Wilkes' action or on what the formal British response would be. 
L;rons wrote Russell privately on November nineteenth urging him not to be 
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"easy" on the U.S. , but this letter 
reached London too late to have any 
effect on 
the Government's decision. 
22 
The British Cabinet first met to disc
uss the Trent incident on November 
twenty-ninth. Lord Russell began a
 draft of demands to be considered 
the next 
day. Prime Minister Palmerston a
dvocated and convinced the other mi
nisters 
to approve immediate and extensive 
preparations for a possible war with
 the 
Union. Arising from this decision m
obilization of the army and navy con
tinued 
through early January 1862. On No
vember thirtieth the ministers discu
ssed and 
approved Russell's dispatch to Lyon
s. This document condemned Wilke
s' action, 
demanded the release of Mason and 
Slidell (and their secretaries George Eustis 
and James McFarland), and requested an ap
ology from the United States govern-
23 
ment. 
Russell's draft was sent to Windsor 
Castle that evening for the Queen's 
approval. She discussed the demand
s with Prince Albert. The Prince 
Consort, 
suffering since the end of autumn fro
m severe catarrh and insomnia (symptoms 
of typhoid), labored through the night jotting d
own some suggestions to soften 
the tone of the document. These sug
gestions, which Russell incorporated
 in the 
final draft of the instructions, emph
asized Britain's desire for continued
 friendly 
relations with the Union and expresse
d hope that the insult on the Trent 
was not 
deliberately intended. Prince Alber
t died December fourteenth, just two weeks 
after completing this service for hi
s country. 
24 
Originally the instructions called fo
r Ambassador Lyons to leave Washi
ng-
ton if the United States did not comp
ly within seven days. Russell furth
er moder-
ated the demands in his supplementar
y directions to Lyons. At his first
 meeting 
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with Secretary of State Seward, Lyons was to informally outline the British de-
mands. At his second meeting Lyons was to read the dispatch in full. If Seward 
asked what the results of noncompliance would be, Lyons was to state that 
Britain did not desire to "menace" the U.S. Government. A special messenger, 
bearing the demands and supplementary directions, left Queenstown December 
25 
second. 
Determined to negotiate from a position of strength, the Cabinet took 
stiff measures to prepare for war. On December ninth they formed a special 
five-man war committee headed by Lord Granville. 26 The Queen issued a procla-
mation prohibiting export of gunpowder, saltpeter, and brimstone to the U.S. 
Admiral Milne placed his West India fleet on alert and began escorting all 
British mail packets in the area. 27 Between December twelfth and January 
fourth 11,000 regular troops, plus substantial arms, munitions, and other 
supplies were shipped to Canada. 28 Employees at the royal arsenals began 
working around the clock producing additional guns and ammunition for the troops 
in Canada. 29 The army and navy were readied for S\vift deployment in case 
hostilities erupted. 
British newspapers reacted favorably to their Government 1 s decisions. 
Some papers heightened their belligerent stance, demanding Seward 1s removal 
and destruction of the Union blockade of Southern ports. 30 Yet, gradually, many . 
Englishmen began to realize the potential consequences of a war. A January 
first editorial reflected these views and the lingering English distaste for the 
North: 
• ? 
. 
(If the United States agrees to our demands) we shall begin the 
New Year ,vith a fitting subject of congratulation. Not only shall 
we have been spared a harassing and costly contest, and be able 
to remain neutral in a war which excites among us little sympathy 
on either side, we shall have given a check to habits of wantoness 
and lawlessness which were becoming instinctive in the American 
people. 31 
In this frame of mind the British awaited the United St.ates' reply. 
42 
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VII. THE UNITED STA TES' REPLY 
TO THE BRlTISH DEI'v1ANDS 
. ,, .• 
Northern newspapers reported the British war preparations in great 
detail. Twisting the lion's tail had been exciting, but now that it had reacted 
with teeth bared, fear supplanted the initial thrill. Daily, the press carried 
stories about France and other European nations condemning Wilkes' act and 
pledging their support for Britain. News of Southern jubilation removed the 
spiteful glee from the North's celebrat.ing. As Christmas approached glum 
circumspection had replaced the ecstasy of mid--November. 
As a result of his extensive international correspondence, Secretary 
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of State Seward, perhaps more than anyone else, sensed the growing precarious-
ness of the Union's position. Adams, Thurlow Weed, John Bigelow (U. s. 
Consul-General at Paris) and others reported widespread European support for 
England. Acting on his own, Captain Wilkes did essentially what Seward had 
initially attempted to order him to do. Feedback from all sides prompted the 
Secretary of State to re-assess the wisdom of his earlier desires. Already 
before meeting with Ambassador Lyons, Seward had begun to consider compro-
mise. 
Ambassador Lyons received Lord Russell's dispatch at 11:30 the night 
of December eighteenth. Lyons met with Seward the next afternoon. When 
pressed, he "unofficially" gave Seward a copy of the dispatch; however, he 
.. • 
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requested that it be shown to no one but the President. Lybns agreed to allow 
forty-eight hours for Seward to consult with Lincoln, before formally presenting 
the demands. This, plus the seven-day time limit in the dispatch itself, gave 
the U.S. Government a total of nine days to respond. Wasting no time, Seward 
immediately began a draft reply for consideration by the President and the 
Cabinet. 1 After the meeting with Lyons, Seward told Henri Mercier, the 
French Ambassador, that no war with Britain would occur. 2 
Despite his reputation for pugnacity, Seward became the advocate of 
prompt compliance. The President was one of those he had to persuade. 
Lincoln w1derstood the seriousness of the capture, but thought room for nego ti-
ation existed. In a tentative reply to Britain, composed Decem be r tenth, he 
pointed to mitigating circumstances, such as the nature of Mason and Slidell's 
mission and the Trent Captain's full knowledge of this mission, and suggested 
a settlement through international arbitration. He concluded the draft, saying 
... we too, as well as Great Britain, have a people justly jealous 
of their rights, and in whose presence our government could undo 
the act complained of only upon a fair showing that it was wrong 
or, at least, very questionable. The United States government 3 
and people, are still willing to make reparation upon such shovving. 
This dispatch was never sent. When Seward first eA'Plainecl the demands to 
Lincoln, the President rejected immediate compliance. Instead Lincoln de-
cided to write a reply, resembling his earlier draft, which he would present 
to the Cabinet along ·with Seward's proposal. The Secretary of State met with 
Lyons for the second time Saturday the twenty-first and pleaded for more tL"lle, 
claiming he had not yet "mastered" the issue. No mail packets would leave 
for England until January first, so Lyons kindly agreed not to officially present 
the demands until Monday, December twenty-third. 4 
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Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, Chairman of the Foreign 
Relations Committee, played a major role in the settlement of the Trent 
Affair. Though not a member of the Cabinet, he was invited to attend the 
meeting in which they discussed the reply to British demands. In November, 
Sumn er suggested and almost persuaded Lincoln to approve a plan to submit 
the Affair to arbitration, with Prussia or another suitable nation making the 
judgment. 5 Yet, when the Senator heard about Britain's reaction from U.S. 
newspapers and correspondence with his English friends, the prominent 
Liberals, John Bright and Richard Cobden, he began to favor any compromise 
that would avert war. Sumner warned Lincoln about the potential consequences 
of the latter: recognition by England and . France of Confederate independence, 
a British blockade of the entire Union coast, attacks on U.S. merchant ships, 
and the ultimate establishment of the South as a nation. 6 Senator Sumner 
joined Seward in urging acceptance of the British demands. 
The Cabinet gathered at 10:00 a.m. Wednesday, December twenty-fifth 
to discuss Russell's dispatch. The President, having changed his mind since 
meeting with Seward, did not write an alternative proposal; therefore, the 
Secretary of State submitted his draft for consideration. It began with an ac-
count of the seizure, stressing the restraint displayed by Lieutenant Fairfax. 
After examining the legal questions it concluded that, even according to 
English authorities, Mason and Slidell, and the Trent itself were subject to 
seizure. Nevertheless, Captain Wilkes should have escorted the Trent to a 
Union port, where a prize court judge could have determined what on board 
constituted contraband. The draft ended: "The four persons in question are 
48 
now held in military custody at Fort Warren in the State of Massachusetts. 
They will be cheerfully liberated. Your lordship (Lord Lyons) will please 
indicate a time and place for receiving them." 7 In rationalizing this decision 
Seward maintained the U.S. had chosen the "intrinsically right" course, 
rather than retaliating for past injuries (British impressment of American 
sailors). 
When discussion of the draft reply commenced, only Seward, Senator 
Sumner, and Postmaster General Blair favored immediate release of the 
· prisoners. The Senator reinforced his position, quoting passages from letters 
written by his English friends, which illustrated the magnitude of British in-
dignation. 8 Hearing these argtm1ents, Attorney General Edward Bat es also 
recommended compromise. He wrote in his diary that night: "· .. with such 
a civil war upon our hands, we cannat (sic) hope for success in a super added 
war with England, backed by the assent and countenance of France. We must 
evade it--with as little damage to our honor and pride as possible. 9 The 
Cabinet adjourned at 2:00 p.m., with President Lincoln undecided and Treasury 
Secretary Salmon Chase still opposed to immediate release. After a night to 
re-assess their views, the Cabinet met the next day and unanimously approved 
Seward's reply, making just a few minor changes in phraseology. Chase com-
plained that although technically right, the decision was "gall and wormwood" 
to him. 10 
On December twenty-su.1:h, the same day the Cabinet reached its 
decision, John P. Hale of New Hampshire (Chairman of the Naval Affairs Com-
mittee) delivered a blistering speech in the Senate, condemning the rumored 
, _. 
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release as a national disgrace. "Let our cities and villages be pillaged and 
burned, but let our National honor be preserved," he stormed. Senator 
Sumner calmly denounced Hale, declaring that the settlement was in good 
11 . . hands. Attemptrng to gam mass approval, Seward made the Government's 
reply public, immediately after informing Lord Lyons. The Secretary of State 
was pleasantly surprised at the widespread expression of acceptance and re-
l . f 12 1e. 
The Navy refused to supply a ship or any officers to accomplish the 
release, so Seward sent E. D. Webster of the State Department, to hire a 
private tug to convey the prisoners from Fort Warren to the British vessel, 
waiting in the Province-town harbor at the tip of Cape Cod. 13 Mason and 
Slidell and their secretaries boarded the English warship Rinaldo around noon 
on January 1, 1862. When a severe storm kept the Rinaldo from its intended 
destination of Halifax, it went instead to St. Thomas by way of Bermuda. 
Ironically, St. Thomas had been the Trent's original destination. Mason and . 
Slidell took another ship from St. Thomas, reaching Southampt on on January 
t;v.,enty-ninth. 14 
. , 
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VIII. THE AFTERMATH 
Immediately after the proclamation of their Government's demands on 
December second, the British public and press eagerly awaited a chance to 
take revenge for Wilkes I insult and to teach the rude Yanke es a lesson. This 
angry belligerence soon moderated when Englishmen began to contemplate the 
grave con seq uences of ,var. On December twenty-second Ambassador Adams 
received a dispatch from Secretary of State Seward, which stated that Captain 
Wilkes had acted without orders and that the U.S. Government had sought no 
excuse to provoke war with Britain. When publicized, the contents and tone 
1 
of this dispatch further diminished British hostilit y and suspicion. By late 
December Englishment were hoping for a peaceful settlement. 
News of the North's capitulation r eached England January eighth. 
Cheers in theaters, a jump in stock prices, and an enormous sigh of relief 
followed the annotmcement in London. The Times commented the next day: 
We draw a long breath and are thankful. The suspense which 
has endured so long, and has weighed so heavily upon our peacefu l 
avocations, has at last terminated. . . . We have done nothing 
to wet up monuments to commemorate; we have onl y held our 
own in the great community of nations~ and read a necessary 
lesson to an ill-mannered companion. 
Englishmen were pleased with their Government's resolution and the Union's 
discretion. Even the Secretary of State received praise: 
. Mr. Seward is, we will venture to say, the r eal author 
of their liberation. The accusers of that eminently able statesman 
and the defamers of the nation whose affairs he so wisely directs, 
will for some time be at a loss for materials of slander, 3 
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declared the Star and Dial. Believing neither Mason nor Slidell would present 
any new reasons for abandoning British neutrality, the Times suggested the 
envoys should be treated with a cold shoulder. The extreme pro-Southern 
press alone, failed to express \vann satisfaction at the settlement. 4 
In America, Ambassador Lyons also felt relieved. Having suppressed 
his personal views on Wilkes' action for over a month and after having granted 
Seward two postponements of the ultimatum's deadlines, Lyons was glad his 
forbearance had produced a harmonious result. He gave substantial credit to 
. Secretary of Stat e Seward: '11 cannot say that my general opinion of l\Ir. Seward 
has undergone any chang e ; but without inqniring int o his motives, I must allow 
him the m e rit of havin g worked very hard and exposed his popularity to very 
great dan ge r. " 5 Lyons saw two main reasons for the Union's capitulation: 
economic self-interest and fear of war . Though relieved at the Affair's out-
come, Lord Lyons remained wary, expecting the Union to find some way of 
retaliating for its humiliation. 6 
Though agreeing with Palmerston's decision to mobilize for war, 
Foreign Minister Russell had favored further negotiations, even if the United 
States rejected the British ultimatum. 7 On January eighth Russell received 
a telegram from Lyons, announcing the U.S. Government's decision. Seward's 
official reply arrived the nm,.'t day. Russell sent Lyons a dispatch on January 
tenth, accepting the reply, but the Foreign Minister disagreed with Seward's 
legal reasoning. "No writer of authority has ever suggested that an ambassador 
proceeding to a neutral state on board one of its merchant ships is contraband 
' .• 
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of war, 118 he commented. The swift Union capitulation cheered Russell, who 
had hoped to avoid additional tense negotiations that could have ended in war. 
For Charles Francis Adams, January eighth concluded some of his 
most arduous weeks as Ambassador. He commented, "Looking back upon this 
critical business I cannot help a feeling of wonder as well as of thankfulness 
for our escape from the great variety of risks with which we were surrounded. 9 
But his perennial pessimism persisted: "So . . . the danger of war is for the 
present removed. I am to remain in this purgatory a while longer. ,,lo 
Actually, the British Government's estimation of Adams' character and ability 
grew substantially during the Affair. The Ambassador's communication prob-
lems wi th Seward continued. Adams first saw the full text of Seward 's reply 
on January thirteenth in the newspapers. Eighteen days since the U.S. 
Cabinet's decision Adams' still had not received a copy from the Secretary of 
State! Nevertheless, Adams swallowed the insult, calling the reply "a very 
. . 11 
able paper," which exhausted the quest10n. 
Although it meant sacrificing a degree of national pride, Northerners, 
anxious to avoid war with Britain and eager to tmdercut Confederate glee, en-
dorsed their Government's capitulation. The premium on gold dropped, stock 
prices resurged, and Army recruitment increased. 12 A New York Times 
editorial summarized Northern sentiment: 
We have honorably escaped the fearful perils of war with England, 
which, whatever might have been its ultimate issue, would have 
given a certain triumph to the Southern rebellion. The real 
disappointment at the pacific settlement of the question will be 
felt in the dominions of Jeff Davis.13 
, ,• 
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In the midst of this satisfaction, Northerners still resented the British for 
14 
over-reacting and taking advantage of the United States in a time of weakness. 
Secretary of State Seward had feared his popularity would plummet 
when he announced Mason and Slidell's release. In fact, he received many 
more complin 1entary than derogatory letters following the decision. 15 Edward 
Everett (Unitarian minister, orator, and educator) wrote: "You have baffled 
them all; and will be deemed in the eyes of the impartial wo rld, to have ga ined 
a much more enviable victory over them than they could have gained by iron -
plated steamers and Armstrong guns. 1116 Those familiar with international 
law were less impressed, calling Seward's l egal reasoning sloppy and lacking 
suitable precedents. 17 Yet the scathing criticism of Hamilton Fish (New York 
Congressman, GDvernor, and Senator, who later became Secr etar; of State 
during the Grant Administration) was atypical: 
In style it is verbose and egotistical; in argument, flims y ; 
and in its conception and genera l scope it is an abandonment 
of the hi gh position we have occupied as a nation upon a great 
principle. We are humbled and disgraced not by the act of the 
surrend er of four of our own citiz ens , but by the manner in 
which it has been done, and the absence of a sound principle upon 
which to rest and justify it . . . . We might and should have 
turned the affair vastly to our credit and advantage; it ha s been 
made the means of our humiliation. 18 
Overall, Seward emerged from the Trent Affair with enhanced domestic and 
international prestige. 
President Lincoln, who had initially opposed immediate release of the 
envoys, had approved capitulation only after hearing please from Senator 
Sumner, Seward, and other Cabinet members. The President ha_d found it 
' .. 
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agonizing to accept the final decision, which was primarily a product of Seward's 
efforts. After the settlement Lincoln wrote: 
We gave due consideration to the case, but at that critical 
period of the war it was soon decided to delive r up the prisoners . 
It was a pretty bitter pill to swallow, but I contented myself 
with believing that England's trium ph in the matter would be 
short lived, and that after ending our war successfully we would 
be so powerful that we could call her to account for all the 
embarrassments she had inflicted on us, 19 
In perhaps the most publicized assessment of the Trent Affair, 
Senator Charl es Sumner examined the legal issues involved on January 9, 1862. 
With some Cabinet members and nearly all foreign ambassadors except Lyons 
attending, he addressed the Senate for nearly two hours. 20 Sumn er agreed 
with the main British complaint that Wilkes should have brought the Trent into 
port, instead of acting as his own judicial officer. But the Senator reminded 
his audience that British captains had acted as judicial officers when they 
impressed American citizens into the Royal Navy during the War of 1812. 
Citing James Madison and treaties between the United States and other countries, 
Sumner asserted that a Union prize court would have freed the Trent because 
she could lawfully carry anyone not in the military service of a belligerent. 
Wilkes I action, though justified according to British precedents, violated 
American traditions. By accepting the release of Mason and Slidell, the 
British Government had endorsed American principles. England vehemently 
denied these charges, but Northern lawyers and newspapers commended Sumner's 
address, declaring he had shown scholarship in exposing Seward's error. 21 
.. · 
56 
What about the objects of this international tunnoil--Mason and 
Slidell? Ambassador Lyons had instructed the commander of the Rinaldo to 
treat them as "private men of distinction" rather than as ambassadors of a 
foreign power. 22 E:iqJeriencing delays in their transatlantic voyage, the two 
emissaries arrived in England three weeks after news of their liberation had 
reached the country. By this time the British public had lost interest in them. 
When Niason unofficially met the Foreign Secretary on February tenth, Russell 
refused to read the envoy's credentials and curtly told him that the position of 
Britain remained unchanged. 23 After suffering more rebuffs and achieving few 
succ esses, Mason abruptly ended his English mission in September 18G3 and 
joined Slid ell in Paris. 24 
J 
57 
Footnotes - Chapt er VIII 
Thurlow Weed, Thui·low Weed's Letters from Europe, 18Gl-G2, For private 
circulation (Nev.- York: University of Rochester), Thurlow Weed to Archbishop 
John Hughes, Dec. 22. 
2 . 
The Ti:nies (London), January 9, 1861, 8:2. 
3 Thurlow Weed, Thurlow Weed's Letters from Europe, 18Gl-62, For private 
circulation (New York: University of Rochester), p. 62 . 
4Ephraim Dou glas Adams, Great Britain and the American Civil War (New 
York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1925), pp. 237-238. 
5 Th omas W. L. Newton, Lord Lyons: A Record of British Diplomacy, 2 vols. 
(London: Edward Arnold, 1913), pp. 71-72. 
6Martin P. Claussen, "Peace Factors in Anglo-American Relations, 1861-
1865," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 26 (]Vfarch, 1940), p. 74. 
7Charles F. Adams, Jr., HTheTrentAffair, 11 American Historical Review, 
17 (April, 1929), Reel 76; and E. D. Adams, p. 215. 
8 Thomas L. Harris, The Trent Affair (Indianapolis: Bowen-Merrill, 1896), 
p. 241. 
9 c. F. Adams, Reel 77, Jan. 9. 
lOib.d 
_1_., Jan. 8. 
11 . Ibid., Jan. 13. 
12 Frederick William Seward, Reminiscences of a War-Time Statesman and 
Diplomat: 1830-1915 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1916), p. 191. 
13 . New York Times, December 30, 1861, 4:3. 
14 E. D. Adams, pp. 236-237. 
15 . 
F. w. Seward, p. 191. 
16 Frederick William Seward, William H. Seward: A Memoir of His Life, with 
Selections from His Letters, 3 vols. (New York: Derby and Miller, 1891), 
p. 34. 
17 
18 
' ' 
Victor H. Cohen, ucharles Sumner and the Trent Affair, 11 Journal of 
Southern History, 22 (May, 1956 ) , pp. 213-214. 
Charles Sumner, Mc1noirs and Letters of Charles Sumner, (ed .) Edward 
L. Pierce (Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1893), IV: 1860-1874, Hamilton 
Fish to Charles Sumner, Dec. 29, 1861. 
19 . Carl Sandburg, Abral1am Lmcoln: The War Years (New York: Harcourt 
and Brace, 1939), I, p. 368. 
20 c. Sumner, p. 55. 
21 V. H. Cohen, pp. 215-218. 
58 
22The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union 
and Con federate Armies, Series 2 (Washington : U.S. Goverm11ent Printing 
Office, 1897), II , Lyons to Commander Hewett, Dec. 30, 1861. 
23 E. D. Adams, pp. 234-235. 
24 D. P. Crook, p. 330. 
f I 
59 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Books 
Adams, Ephraim Douglas. Great Britain and the American Civil War. 2 vols. 
New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1925. 
Allen, H. C. Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American 
Relations (1783-1952). New York: St. Martin's Press, 1955. 
Bailey, Thomas A. A Diplomatic History of the American People. 8th ed. 
New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969. 
Bates, Edward. The Diary of Edward Bates 1859-1866. Edited by Howard K. 
Beale. Washington: U.S. Govenunent Printing Office, 1933. 
Bigelow, John. Retrospections of an Active Life. 5 vols. New York: Baker 
and Taylor, 1909. 
Chase, Salmon P. Inside Lincoln's Cabinet: The Civil War Diaries of Salmon 
P. Chase. Edited by David Donald. New York: Longmans-Green, 
19 54. 
-Crook, D. P. The North, the South, and the Powers: 1861-1865. New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, 1974. 
Davis, cTefferson. Jefferson Davis,Constitutionalist, His Letters Papers, and 
Speeches. Edited by Dunbar Rowland. 5 vols. Jackson, l\Iississippi: 
Mississippi Department of Archives and History, 1923. 
Harris, Thomas L. The Trent Affair. In dianapolis: Bowen-Merrill, 1896 . 
Jones, Robert H. Di srupted Decades: The Civil War and Reconstruction Years. 
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 19 73. 
Lincoln, Abraham. The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. Edited by Roy 
P. Basler. Vol. 5: 1861-1 862 . New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers 
University Press, 1953. 
Mason, Vir gini a (ed.). The Public Life and Dipl oma tic Correspond ence of 
James M. l\fason. New York: Neale , 1906. · 
Moore, Frank (ed.). The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events, 
with Documents, Narratives, Illustrative Incidents, Poetry, etc. 
Vol. 3. New York: G. P. Putnam, 18G4. 
60 
Newton, Thomas W. L. Lord Lyons: A Record of British Diplomacy. 2 vols. 
London: Edward Arnold, 1913. 
Owsley, Frank Lawrence. King Cotton Diplorn acy: Foreign Relations of the 
Confederate States of America. 2nd ed. revised by Harriet Chappell 
Owsley. Chica go: University of Chicago Press, 1959. 
Randall, J. G. Lincoln the President. Vol. 2. New York: Dodd and Mead, 
1945. 
Sandburg, Carl. Abraham Lincoln: The War Years. Vol. 1. New York: 
Harcourt and Brac e, 1939. 
Sears, Louis Martin. John Slidell. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University 
Press, 1925. 
Seward, Frederick William. Reminiscences of a War-Time Statesman and 
Diplomat: 1830-1915. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1916. 
Seward, Frederick William. William H. Seward: A Memoir of His Life, with 
Selections from His Letters. 3 vols. New York: Derby and Miller, 
1891. Vol. 3: Seward at Washington as Senator and Secretary of 
State, 1861-1872. 
Seward, William Henry. The Works of William H. Seward. Edited by George 
E. Baker. Vol. 5 . Boston: Houghton and Mifflin, 1884. 
Stern, Philip Van Doren. When th e Guns Roared; World Aspects of th e Ameri-
can Civil War. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1965. 
Sumner, Charles. Memoirs and Letters of Charles Sumner. Edited by Edward 
L. Pierce. Vol. 4: 1860-1874. Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1893. 
Van Deusen, Glyndon G. William Henry Seward. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1967. 
The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union 
and Confederate Arn1ies. Series 2, Vol. 2. Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1897. 
Weed, Thurlow. Thurlow Weed's Letters from Europe, 1861-62. For private 
circulation. New York: University of Rochester. 
61 
Journals 
Adams, Charles F. Jr. "Th e Trent Affair. 11 American Historical Review, 1 7 
(April, 1912), 540-5G2. 
Bourne, Kenneth. "British Preparation for War with the North, 1861-1862." 
English Historical Review, 76 (Octob er , 1961), 600-632. 
Claussen, Martin P. "P eace Factors in Anglo-American Relations, 1861-
1865." Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 26 (11:arch,1940), 511-
522. 
Coh en, Victor H. "Charles Sumner and the Trent Affair." Journal of South ern 
History, 22 (May,1956), 205-219. 
Hernon, Joseph JVI. Jr. "British Sympathies in the American Civil War: A 
Reconsideration." clournal of Southern History, 33 (August , 1967), 
356-367. 
Wheeler-Bennett, Sir John. "The Trent Affair: How the Prince Consort 
Saved the United States. 11 History Today, II (December, 1961), 
805-81G. 
Manuscript Collections 
Boston, Mass. Massachusetts Historical Soci ety . Adams Papers. 
Rochester, New York. University of Rochester. Seward Papers. 
Rochester, New York. University of Rochester. Weed Papers 
Newspapers 
Enquirer (Richmond, Virginia), Nov. 19, 1861. 
New York Times, November 17, 1861. 
The Times (London), Nov. 28, 1861. 
